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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1923 
___________ 
 
TOMOKO FUNAYAMA, 
    Appellant 
 
v. 
 
NICHIA AMERICA CORPORATION 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 5-12-cv-05406) 
District Judge:  Honorable Lawrence F. Stengel 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 12, 2014 
 
Before: JORDAN, COWEN and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: September 18, 2014 ) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Tomoko Funayama, proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
granting Defendant/Appellee Nichia America Corporation’s (“Nichia”) motion to dismiss 
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Funayama’s most recent employment discrimination lawsuit.  We will affirm the District 
Court’s order. 
 Funayama was employed by Nichia from 1995 through 2008.  On August 28, 
2008, she filed a Second Amended Complaint with the Pennsylvania Human Relations 
Commission and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, raising several 
allegations of employment discrimination, including a claim that she had been paid less 
than Tim Ujike, a male counterpart, based on her gender.  In December 2008, after the 
administrative proceedings concluded, Funayama filed an employment discrimination 
complaint before the United States District Court of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
(See E.D. Pa. Civ. No. 5:08-cv-05599.)  In her amended complaint, she raised claims 
under several discrimination statutes, including Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  
She claimed that, throughout their employment relationship, Nichia had discriminated 
against her based on her gender, age, and national origin.  Her federal complaint did not 
include a claim under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d).  
 In November 2010, Funayama sought leave to amend her 2008 complaint so that 
she could add, among others, a count under the Equal Pay Act, asserting that she was 
compensated less because of her gender.  As in her administrative complaint, Funayama 
claimed that Tim Ujike was paid more for doing equal work.  The District Court denied 
Funayama’s motion in an order entered in December 2010.  Then, in its April 2011 
decision granting Nichia’s summary judgment motion, the District Court detailed its 
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reasons for denying Funayama’s request to amend her complaint.  The District Court 
concluded that amendment would have been prejudicial to Nichia, as well as futile.  It 
explained that, although Ujike was paid more, he had been identified several times as 
Funayama’s direct supervisor, and there was no evidence that he and Funayama 
performed the same functions with the same level of responsibility.  We affirmed the 
District Court’s grant of summary judgment on May 17, 2012.  
 On October 2, 2012, Funayama filed her current complaint, which raises the same 
Equal Pay Act claim that she unsuccessfully sought to add to her 2008 complaint.  She 
asserts that she “suffered from pay disparity stemming from her hidden employment 
status,” which she discovered during discovery in the 2008 case when she found out that 
Nichia allegedly had classified her as an “expatriate” employee but paid her the lower 
wages and provided her with the inferior benefits package of a locally-hired employee 
because she is a woman.1  
 On March 17, 2014, the District Court entered an order granting Nichia’s motion 
to dismiss Funayama’s complaint, determining that it was barred by the doctrine of res 
judicata.  The District Court’s alternative bases for dismissal were that Funayama’s claim 
was barred by the statute of limitations and that she had failed to set forth a prima facie 
case.  
                                              
1 Funayama states that “expatriate” employees are Japanese employees sent to the United States to work for Nichia 
America by its Japanese parent corporation.  “Locally-hired” employees are hired by Nichia America in the United 
States.  
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 Funayama now appeals.2  
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See DiGiacomo v. Teamsters Pension 
Trust Fund, 420 F.3d 220, 222 n.4 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 The District Court concluded that Funayama’s Equal Pay Act claim was barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata.  We agree.  Res judicata, also known as claim preclusion, 
requires: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit involving, (2) the same parties 
or their privies, and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”  Duhaney v. 
Att’y Gen., 621 F.3d 340, 347 (3d Cir. 2010).  Moreover, this doctrine bars not only 
claims that have been litigated, but also those claims that could have been asserted in the 
prior action.  See id.  
 Funayama filed an employment action against Nichia in 2008, and in her 
Amended Complaint she asserted that she had been discriminated against based on her 
gender, race, age, and national origin.  The District Court disposed of Funayama’s 
employment discrimination claims on the merits when it granted Nichia’s motion for 
summary judgment.  Scrutiny of the two complaints leaves no doubt that this action 
arises from the same events as the earlier case.  See Davis v. United States Steel Supply, 
                                              
2 The District Court denied Funayama’s motion for reconsideration of its March 17, 2014 order on April 17, 2014.  
Because Funayama did not file an amended notice of appeal, we do not have authority to review the District Court’s 
decision denying her motion for reconsideration. See United States v. McGlory, 202 F.3d 664, 668 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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688 F.2d 166, 171 (3d Cir. 1982) (stating that whether res judicata applies depends on the 
“essential similarity of the underlying events giving rise to the various claims” rather than 
the “specific legal theory invoked”); Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 
173 (3d Cir. 2009).  As the District Court explained, Funayama’s current allegation that 
Nichia willfully and wantonly “set her apart from other male employees by 
discriminating against her in terms of compensation,” is “indisputably connected to the 
2008 action in that it arises out of the identical employment relationship and involves the 
same type of discrimination.”  Moreover, there is no doubt that Funayama could have 
brought the Equal Pay Act claim in her 2008 complaint, as her inclusion of a nearly 
identical pay disparity claim in her 2008 administrative complaint belies her contention 
that she was not aware of the claim until 2010.  That she may have learned additional 
information supporting an Equal Pay Act claim in 2010 has no bearing on whether she 
could have brought the claim in her original complaint.  See Elkadrawy, 584 F.3d at 173-
74.  Thus, for essentially the reasons relied upon by the District Court, we agree that 
Funayama’s 2012 cause of action is barred as res judicata, and will affirm the District 
Court’s order dismissing Funayama’s complaint.3  
 
                                              
3 Because we affirm on this basis, we need not reach the District Court’s alternate bases for its decision.  
Additionally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Funayama’s state law claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); Hedges v. Musco, 204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000). 
 
